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OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 During an investigation, federal law enforcement 
officials learned that Carlton Williams was involved in the 
distribution of heroin.  The investigation involved 
surveillance of Williams’s activity, which eventually led to a 
stop of his car.  During the traffic stop, law enforcement 
officials conducted a search of Williams’s car and its 
contents.  As they expected, the officials discovered drugs 
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during the search.  Williams subsequently pleaded guilty to 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 
federal drug laws.  Williams now appeals the denial of his 
suppression motion and application of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender enhancement.  
Finding no merit in either claim, we will affirm Williams’s 
conviction and sentence.   
 
I.  
A. Factual Background  
 The underlying facts are uncontested.  During an 
investigation that began as early as November 2012, a Drug 
Enforcement Administration task force officer learned that 
Williams bought heroin in Detroit, Michigan, which he 
packaged and sold in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The officer 
subsequently placed a GPS tracker on Williams’s car and 
monitored his movements for approximately one month.  On 
January 11, 2013, data from the GPS tracker indicated that 
Williams’s car was driven to Detroit.  Suspecting that 
Williams drove his car to Detroit to retrieve heroin, the task 
force officer organized a plan to have Williams’s car stopped 
upon its return to Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania State Police 
trooper Michael Volk effectuated the traffic stop.   
 
 Later that same evening, Trooper Volk observed 
Williams’s car speeding and stopped it.  The trooper issued a 
citation for the traffic violation and told Williams that he was 
free to go.  Before Williams left, however, Trooper Volk 
asked Williams for consent to search his car.  Williams 
agreed and signed a consent to search form labeled “Waiver 
of Rights and Consent to Search.”  The parties do not dispute 
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that Williams knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
consented to the search of his car, its contents, and his person.   
 
 Trooper Volk, with the help of other troopers, 
commenced a search of Williams’s car that lasted for 
approximately seventy-one minutes.  The troopers searched 
every part of the car, including its passenger compartment, 
trunk, and undercarriage.  Unable to locate any narcotics, 
Trooper Volk requested the assistance of a narcotics-detection 
dog.  Shortly thereafter, Trooper Volk updated another 
trooper on the progress of the search and indicated that “[the 
search] was going to take awhile [because] he hadn’t found 
[the heroin], but the K-9 was on its way coming from a 
distance.”1   
 
 Williams eventually became less patient and told 
Trooper Volk “you searched my car three times, now you 
hold me up and I have to go.”2  According to Williams, he 
made this statement in only “a regular tone of voice that he 
expected Trooper Volk to hear but [the trooper] was at a 
distance and there was a lot of noise from the turnpike traffic 
and the wind.”3  Other than Williams’s own testimony, there 
was no evidence that Trooper Volk heard his alleged protest.  
The District Court, as a result, found Williams’s testimony 
“only credible to a degree.”4   
The troopers continued their search despite Williams’s 
irritation.  As the search continued, Williams requested five 
                                              
1 United States v. Williams, 2015 WL 5602617, at *6 n.5 
(W.D. Pa. 2015).   
2 Id. at *6.    
3 Id. 
4 Id.   
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items from his car, including his two cellular phones.  One of 
the troopers retrieved Williams’s cellular phones and 
attempted to search them before handing them over to 
Williams.  The trooper was able to read the text messages 
contained on only one of the devices because the other device 
was password-protected.  The trooper who read Williams’s 
text messages told Trooper Volk that the messages suggested 
that Williams had “something.”5  When Williams was 
confronted about the text messages, he warned the officers 
that they could not search his phone without a warrant.   
 
The search of the car continued.  After fifty-one 
minutes, the troopers had not discovered any drugs.  They 
began to disassemble Williams’s sound system speakers.  
Williams objected that the troopers were not permitted to 
search his speakers without a warrant.  Trooper Volk told 
Williams to “relax,” to which Williams replied, “I’ve been 
out here half an hour, man.”6  Upon Williams’s protest, 
Trooper Volk reassembled the car’s speakers but otherwise 
continued searching the vehicle.  Soon after, and seventy-one 
minutes into the search, Trooper Volk discovered thirty-nine 
grams of heroin in a sleeve covering the car’s parking brake 
lever.  Williams was immediately arrested.  
 
B. Procedural History  
  Williams was charged with possession of heroin with 
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(C).  He filed a number of pretrial motions, 
including a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 
                                              
5 App. 222.  
6 Williams, 2015 WL 5602617, at *6.   
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car.  Following a two-day hearing and the submission of post-
hearing briefing, the District Court denied Williams’s 
suppression motion, because it concluded that Williams had 
voluntarily consented to the search and had not unequivocally 
withdrawn his consent during the search.    
 
 Prior to Williams’s sentencing, the United States 
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report 
(PSR), which the District Court adopted without change.  The 
sentencing range calculation included U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s 
career offender enhancement because the District Court 
concluded that Williams had two prior convictions for 
controlled substance offenses:  a 2007 conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute heroin and a 1998 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  
Williams admitted to various predicate acts forming the basis 
for his § 1962 RICO conviction, all of which were for 
possession with intent to distribute either crack cocaine or 
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 
841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and 846.7  As a result of the career offender 
enhancement, Williams faced a Guidelines sentencing range 
of 210-262 months.  On May 11, 2016, Williams entered a 
conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his suppression motion and the application of the 
Guidelines’ career offender designation.  Williams was 
sentenced to, inter alia, a term of 160 months’ imprisonment.  
This appeal followed.  
 
 Williams appeals both the denial of his suppression 
motion and the District Court’s application of the Guidelines’ 
                                              
7 Supp. App. 19-25. 
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career offender designation.  The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a).8 
II.  
  “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings, 
and we exercise plenary review of its application of the law to 
those facts.”9  “‘A finding is clearly erroneous when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.’”10  Therefore, “‘[i]f the 
[D]istrict [C]ourt’s account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety,’ we will not reverse 
it even if, as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the 
evidence differently.”11 
 
A. The District Court Properly Denied Williams’s 
Motion to Suppress 
 
 With respect to his suppression motion, Williams 
claims that the District Court erred in denying his suppression 
                                              
8 United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2009). 
9 United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 651-52 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d 
Cir. 2002)).  
10 United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  
11 Price, 558 F.3d at 277 (quoting Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)). 
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motion because he properly withdrew his consent to the 
search or was improperly prevented from doing so.   
 
 It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment protects 
suspects from unreasonable searches.12  “[A] search 
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 
[presumptively] unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”13  A 
search conducted with consent is one such “established 
exception.”14  The appellant concedes that the search here 
began as a consensual one.  He contends, however, that the 
search ceased to be so when he withdrew his consent or was 
prevented from doing so.  Before reaching the issue of 
whether Williams withdrew his consent in this case, we must 
first determine whether the Fourth Amendment allows the 
subject of a consensual search to terminate the search by 
withdrawing his consent. Neither this Court nor the 
Supreme Court has expressly established that the subject of a 
consensual search may withdraw consent that he has 
voluntarily given.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
recognized that a person may “delimit as he chooses the 
scope of the search to which he consents.”15  In so holding, 
the Court has instructed that the standard for measuring the 
limitations placed on a consensual search “is that of objective 
reasonableness.”16  Thus, in determining the legal bounds of a 
                                              
12 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
13 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).  
14 Id. at 219 (citations omitted).   
15 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).  
16 Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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consensual search, we must determine “what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect.”17  Relying on Florida v. 
Jimeno’s recognition that a consensual search may be 
restricted by individuals, our sister circuits that have 
considered whether individuals may withdraw consent to 
search have unanimously answered in the affirmative.18  
Today, we join them.  
 
 Although the Supreme Court has not itself expressly 
held that the subject of a consensual search may terminate the 
search by withdrawing his consent, considerable support for 
such a proposition is easily found in its Fourth Amendment 
                                              
17 See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (applying a reasonable person 
standard for determining the scope of consent). 
18 See United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“Clearly a person may limit or withdraw his consent to 
a search, and the police must honor such limitations.”); 
Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he consenting party may limit the scope of that search, 
and hence at any moment may retract his consent”); United 
States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Once 
given, consent to search may be withdrawn[.]”); United States 
v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A 
suspect is free, however, after initially giving consent, to 
delimit or withdraw his or her consent at anytime.”); see also 
United States v. Pelle, No. 05-407, 2006 WL 436920, at *4 
(D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2006) (“The courts which have decided the 
issue, however, have unanimously answered that question in 
the affirmative, generally holding that any such withdrawal 
must be supported by unambiguous acts or unequivocal 
statements.”) (collecting cases).    
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jurisprudence.  The Court recognized in Walter v. United 
States,19 and later in Jimeno,20 that a consensual search 
satisfies the mandates of the Constitution only if conducted 
within the boundaries of the consent given.  This recognition 
establishes that it is the subject of a consensual search who 
decides the terms of the search.  Although Walter and Jimeno 
expressly consider only a party’s right to limit the particular 
things officials may search, nothing in those opinions 
suggests that consent, which waives Fourth Amendment 
rights, cannot otherwise be narrowed, qualified, or 
withdrawn. That a party may terminate a search by 
withdrawing his consent is a corollary of the recognition that 
the subject of a consensual search determines the parameters 
of that search.   
 
 Moreover, recognition of a party’s right to take away 
the consent that he or she has conferred advances society’s 
interest in promoting consensual searches.  The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that consensual searches are 
important because they promote the effective enforcement of 
criminal laws.21  This is particularly true where there is lack 
of probable cause to arrest or search because, in such 
                                              
19 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (“When an official search is 
properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance 
of a valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the 
terms of its authorization.”). 
20 500 U.S. at 252. 
21 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 (“[A] search pursuant to 
consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the 
subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a 
constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of 
effective police activity.”). 
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situations, “a search authorized by a valid consent may be the 
only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.”22  
Moreover, a rule restricting the ability to withdraw consent 
would likely discourage people from consenting to searches 
when they otherwise might have done so.  In the present case, 
for example, Williams voluntarily authorized the troopers to 
conduct a search.  He then admonished the troopers that the 
search of his speakers and electronic devices was not within 
the bounds of his authorization.  As a result, the troopers 
reassembled the speakers and ceased examining the phone 
that was not password-protected.  However, “where a suspect 
does not withdraw his valid consent to a search for illegal 
substances before they are discovered, the consent remains 
valid and the substances are admissible as evidence.”23    
 
 Turning to the merits of this case, we must decide 
whether Williams actually withdrew his consent.  As the 
parties note, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”24  Thus, in determining 
whether suspects have withdrawn their consent to a search, 
courts have been guided by how a reasonable person would 
have understood the exchange between law enforcement 
                                              
22 Id. at 227 (citation omitted).  
23 Dyer, 784 F.2d at 816. 
24 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations 
omitted). 
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officers and suspects.25  Courts agree that a reasonable person 
would not understand certain equivocal acts or statements to 
convey a suspect’s desire to withdraw consent that he has 
voluntarily conferred.26  Ambiguous acts and statements do 
not ordinarily lend themselves to a conclusive determination 
of whether consent has been withdrawn.  Once it has been 
established that a suspect has voluntarily consented to a 
search, it is his burden to demonstrate that he has withdrawn 
that consent by pointing to an act or statement that an 
objective viewer would understand as an expression of his 
desire to no longer be searched.     
 
 With these principles in mind, we hold that the 
circumstances here do not demonstrate that Williams 
withdrew his consent to the troopers’ search of his car.   
Williams knew how to express the absence of consent to 
search.  As the record demonstrates, Williams told the 
troopers that they did not have consent to search his speakers 
                                              
25 See e.g., United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 
858 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Jimeno 500 U.S. at 251 (“The 
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under 
the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—
what would the typical reasonable person have understood by 
the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” (citations 
omitted)).  
26 See, e.g., United States v. $304,980.00 in U.S. Currency, 
732 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[P]olice officers do not 
act unreasonably by failing to halt their search every time a 
consenting suspect equivocates.”); Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 
at 858 (requiring “‘unequivocal act or statement of 
withdrawal’” (quoting United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 
67 (5th Cir. 1991)).  
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or his cellular phones.  The search of those areas then 
stopped. 
 
 Williams also argues that he conveyed withdrawal of 
his consent to search the car when he complained that he had 
been standing “out [there] half an hour” and after he told 
officer Volk “you searched my car three times [and] y’all got 
me on the side of this road in the middle of the winter holding 
me up and I got to go.”27  The District Court held that 
Williams’s comments only “constituted manifestations of 
irritation” and not statements indicating that he was 
withdrawing the consent he had conferred.28  We agree.  
Although defendants need not use a special set of words to 
withdraw consent, they must do more than express 
unhappiness about the search to which they consented.   
 
 Other courts have reached the same conclusion when 
presented with similar facts.  For example, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Gray held that a suspect 
had not withdrawn consent simply by objecting that the 
search was “ridiculous” and that he was “ready to go.”29  The 
court held that such statements amounted only to 
“expressions of impatience.”30  The court warned that 
“protests about the length of time the search was taking 
without any specific request to leave did not under the 
circumstances” amount to a withdrawal of consent.31  
                                              
27 Williams, 2015 WL 5602617, at *6; App. 196, 198-99.     
28 Williams, 2015 WL 5602617 at *9.   
29 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004). 
30 Id.  
31 U.S. v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Gray, 369 F.3d at 1026). 
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Similarly, Williams’s statements here were expressions of 
frustration.  Williams falls short of meeting his burden of 
proof to establish that his consent was withdrawn.  
 
 Williams alternatively contends that, even if he did not 
withdraw his consent to the search, the evidence should be 
suppressed because the “coercive” nature of the search 
prevented him from revoking consent.   
 
 The Fourth Amendment requires that consent not be 
coerced.32  The question of whether Williams’s consent was 
at any point the product of coercion is “a question of fact 
determined from the totality of the circumstances.”33  In 
assessing the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent, we 
consider “the age, education, and intelligence of the subject; 
whether the subject was advised of his or her constitutional 
rights; the length of the encounter; the repetition or duration 
of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment.”34  
Our analysis “must accord the district court’s conclusion that 
[Williams]’s consent was [voluntary] great deference, unless 
our examination of the record shows that the district court 
committed clear error.”35  Thus, the District Court’s finding 
that Williams’s consent was voluntary will not be overturned 
unless it is “(1) completely devoid of minimum evidentiary 
                                              
32 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. 
33 United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 1991).   
34 Price, 558 F.3d at 278 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; 
United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 955 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
35 Antoon, 933 F.2d at 204 (citation omitted).  
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support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no 
rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”36  
 
 Our assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
precludes us from concluding that the District Court 
committed clear error.  As the District Court noted, 
Williams’s interaction with the troopers was not hostile.  The 
troopers neither made threats nor showed force.  No restraints 
were employed at the time of the search.  The District Court’s 
finding that Williams exhibited his ability to intelligently 
delimit the scope of the search is supported by the record.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding that, 
throughout the entire encounter, Williams’s grant of consent 
was not the product of coercion.  
 
B. The District Court Properly Applied the 
Guidelines’ Career Offender Enhancement 
 
Williams next appeals his career offender designation, 
arguing that his 1998 RICO conviction—predicated on his 
distribution of heroin and crack cocaine—was not a requisite 
“controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  We disagree.   
 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant must be 
sentenced as a “career offender” if:  (1) he was at least 
eighteen years old when he committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense is a felony crime of 
violence or controlled substance offense; and (3) he has at 
                                              
36 Id. (quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d 
Cir.1972)).   
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least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence or 
controlled substance offense.37 
 
In this case, there is no dispute that the instant 
offense—possession with intent to distribute heroin in 
violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C)—is a controlled 
substance offense.  Nor is there any doubt that Williams was 
at least eighteen at the time.  The parties agree that 
Williams’s 2007 conviction for possession with intent to 
distribute heroin supplies one of the two required prior felony 
convictions.  The 1998 RICO conviction, we now hold, 
supplies the second.   
 
Ordinarily, to determine whether a prior conviction 
qualifies as a crime of violence or controlled substance 
offense, we apply a categorical approach.38  We consider only 
the elements of the crime of conviction and assess whether 
they fall within the bounds of a crime of violence or 
controlled substance offense, as defined under the 
Guidelines.39  To avoid the “practical difficulties and 
potential unfairness” inherent in “determining the precise 
facts underlying a defendant’s [prior] conviction,” which may 
have occurred years or decades ago, we do not excavate or 
dissect the underlying factual record.40    
 
                                              
37 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 
38 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990).   
39 See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 133 (3d 
Cir. 2017).   
40 United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 
2016).   
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There is an exception, however.  When a crime is 
defined with alternative elements, we may review a limited 
set of documents—including the indictment and plea 
colloquy, among others—but only to determine which version 
of the statute formed the basis of the prior conviction.41  Such 
a statute is termed “divisible” and this approach—a more 
record-invasive variant of the categorical approach—is called 
the “modified categorical approach.”   
 
RICO, in particular Section 1962(c), is one such 
divisible statute.  That statutory subsection, the basis for 
Williams’s 1998 RICO conviction, proscribes “conduct[ing] . 
. . [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt.”  It proscribes two 
alternative forms of conduct:  either racketeering activity or 
the collection of unlawful debt.  That fork in the statute has 
even more branches.  “Racketeering activity,” a statutory 
phrase without independent meaning, has “constituent parts” 
or alternative “elements” that need to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.42  Under RICO, 
those elements are known as “predicate acts” and include 
certain violations of federal law, including “fraud connected 
with a case under title 11,” or “fraud in the sale of securities,” 
or “the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, 
concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a 
                                              
41 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261-62 (2013) 
(reiterating that, for purposes of this inquiry, we may not 
examine a defendant’s prior conduct).     
42 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016); see 
also 3d Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 6.18.1962C-6 (2018) 
(establishing that the government must prove predicate acts 
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction).    
 18 
 
controlled substance or listed chemical.”43  Without 
consulting the record, we would not know which of these 
multiple alternatives yielded Williams’s prior RICO 
conviction. 
 
Fortunately, because Section 1962(c) is divisible, we 
may consult select portions of the record under the modified 
categorical approach to make that determination.  The 
superseding indictment and Williams’s 1998 plea colloquy 
are illuminating.  They reveal that Williams pleaded guilty to 
a RICO violation under Section 1962(c) and five underlying 
RICO predicate acts.44  All five of those predicate acts of 
racketeering were violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)—or 
conspiracy to commit such a violation under 21 U.S.C. § 
846.45  Specifically, he admitted to “manufactur[ing], 
distribut[ing], or dispens[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense” heroin or crack 
cocaine.46  Without probing the record further or examining 
Williams’s prior conduct, we now know that Williams’s prior 
RICO conviction necessarily implicated only a limited 
portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D), namely, only the 
“felonious manufacture,” or “recei[pt],” or “buying, selling, 
or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance.”47  This 
limited and non-fact-intensive review of the record unmasks 
the specific version of the RICO statute under which 
Williams was convicted:  “conduct[ing] . . . [an] enterprise’s 
affairs” through “a pattern of racketeering activity” by 
                                              
43 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D).  
44 App. 324. 
45 Supp. App. 19-25. 
46 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).   
47 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) 
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“felonious[ly] manufactur[ing],” or “receiving,” or “buying, 
selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or 
listed chemical.”48   
 
The final step in this analysis is to assess whether the 
offense of conviction—as decoded by this selective review of 
the record—sweeps any more broadly than the relevant 
generic offense,49 in this case a “controlled substance 
offense” as defined in the Guidelines.  Section 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines defines a “controlled substance offense” as “the 
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the 
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, 
distribute, or dispense.”50  The specific version of RICO 
implicated by Williams’s prior conviction encompasses only 
the “felonious manufacture,” or “recei[pt],” or “buying, 
selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance”:  It is 
categorically a subset of the Guidelines’ definition of a 
“controlled substance offense.”  For that reason, Williams’s 
prior RICO conviction was a “controlled substance offense” 
under the Guidelines. 
 
Because both his 2007 heroin distribution conviction 
and his 1998 RICO conviction were prior felony convictions 
for controlled substance offenses, the District Court correctly 
applied the career offender enhancement to Williams.   
 
 
                                              
48 Id. §§ 1961(1)(D), 1962(c). 
49 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.   
50 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).   
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
1 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. 
 
I agree with my colleagues that the District Court did 
not err when it denied Williams’s motion to suppress evidence. 
I also agree that Williams is—as the District Court found—a 
career offender under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (2015) (USSG). As to that second issue, I concur in 
the judgment only because I cannot subscribe to the Majority’s 
modified categorical approach, which I believe misapplies the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575 (1990), and Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016). But because a proper application of the modified 
categorical approach would yield absurd results in cases 
involving RICO predicate offenses, I am convinced that the 
Supreme Court would not apply it here. Accordingly, I agree 
with my colleagues that Williams is a career offender. 
At the outset, it’s important to note that the Supreme 
Court has not yet applied Taylor (or Mathis) in a case involving 
a RICO predicate offense. And although some of our sister 
courts have adjudicated cases involving the interplay between 
RICO and the § 4B1.1 career offender guideline, they have not 
settled on a consistent mode of analysis. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit placed “the focus of the inquiry . . . on 
the conduct for which [the defendant] was convicted” without 
mentioning the categorical approach or citing Taylor. United 
States v. Scott, 642 F.3d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
The First Circuit has taken a different tack, explaining that in 
determining whether a RICO conviction counts toward the 
career offender enhancement, courts should “in fidelity to 
Taylor principles . . . merely assess the nature and object of the 
racketeering activity as described in the indictment and fleshed 
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out in the jury instructions.” United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 
15, 19–21 (1st Cir. 1994). Like the First Circuit, a panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit professed fealty to Taylor, but it looked to 
“the facts to which [the defendant] stipulated” in comparing 
the conduct underlying the defendant’s prior racketeering 
conviction with the definition of a “controlled substance 
offense” under USSG § 4B1.2(b). United States v. Rosquete, 
208 F. App’x 737, 739–41 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
Here, my colleagues have chosen to follow the path 
marked by the Supreme Court in Taylor and Mathis. And if the 
Taylor/Mathis framework applies to this case, the Majority is 
quite right that the relevant statute (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) is 
divisible, which requires application of the modified 
categorical approach. 
But the modified categorical approach yields a result 
contrary to the one the Majority reaches. Section 1961(1)(D), 
which specifies the type of racketeering activity Williams was 
engaged in, is not “categorically a subset of the Guidelines’ 
definition of a ‘controlled substance offense.’” Maj. Op. 19. 
Under Guidelines § 4B1.2(b), a “controlled substance offense” 
encompasses “the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 
dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a 
counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, 
export, distribute, or dispense.” That definition differs from 
Williams’s RICO conviction, which involved “the felonious 
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, 
selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed 
chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United 
States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D). A comparison of the two 
provisions makes clear that Williams’s RICO offense 
3 
encompasses conduct that § 4B1.2(b) does not cover, such as 
“receiving, concealment, buying . . . or otherwise dealing in a 
controlled substance.” See id. Because it “sweeps more broadly 
than the generic crime,” Williams’s RICO conviction is not a 
qualifying offense under the modified categorical approach. 
See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013). 
Would the Supreme Court really conclude that 
Williams’s RICO conviction did not constitute a “controlled 
substance offense”? I think not. The predicate acts underlying 
Williams’s conviction included the distribution of and 
possession with intent to distribute: (1) in excess of a kilogram 
of heroin; (2) in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base; (3) in 
excess of 5 grams of cocaine base; (4) less than 5 grams of 
cocaine base; and (5) less than 100 grams of heroin. The 
enumeration of these predicate acts plainly establishes that 
Williams’s RICO conviction is for a controlled substance 
offense. 
To hold that it is not defies common sense not only in 
this case, but in any RICO case predicated on federal drug 
crimes. This is so because in every such case the “element” that 
Taylor and Mathis require us to compare to USSG § 4B1.2(b) 
will be the same: 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D). See Maj. Op. 18–19. 
An application of the modified categorical approach will thus 
generate the same nonsensical answer—that a RICO 
conviction based on controlled substance offenses is not a 
“controlled substance offense”—every time. 
I cannot accept that Congress, the United States 
Sentencing Commission, or the Supreme Court would endorse 
such an absurd result. Accordingly, I would hold that the 
approach the Court has articulated in cases like Taylor, 
Descamps, and Mathis does not apply here. The categorical 
4 
approach was developed to ensure that federal defendants who 
have committed essentially the same crimes in the past don’t 
receive disparate sentences merely because they committed 
those prior offenses in different states. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
591–92. That policy justification has no relevance here, where 
the nature of the prior federal conviction is clear on the face of 
the docket. 
Were the Supreme Court confronted with the question 
before us, I think it would not attempt to pound the square peg 
of RICO into the round hole of the categorical/modified 
categorical approach. It would be especially surprising for the 
Court to do so not only because the predicate offense at issue 
here is markedly different from the state burglary crimes at 
issue in Taylor and Mathis, but also because several Justices 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the categorical approach 
generally.1 For these reasons, I would not apply the categorical 
approach of Taylor and Mathis to the RICO offense at issue 
here. Instead, I would hold that Williams’s RICO conviction 
                                                                
1 See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision is a stark illustration of the 
arbitrary and inequitable results produced by applying an 
elements based approach to this sentencing scheme.”); id. at 
2268 (Alito, J., dissenting) (categorical approach “has 
increasingly led to results that Congress could not have 
intended”); see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (criticizing Taylor’s implications for factfinding at 
sentencing in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000)); id. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy and 
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court’s overscrupulous regard 
for formality leads it not only to an absurd result, but also to a 
result that Congress plainly hoped to avoid.”). 
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was, on its face, a controlled substance offense that counted 
toward the USSG § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, I join the Court’s opinion 
regarding the denial of Williams’s motion to suppress, and I 
concur in the Court’s judgment that Williams is a career 
offender. 
1 
 
ROTH, J., Concurring 
 Although I agree with the reasoning and the 
conclusions of the majority opinion, which I in fact wrote, I 
write separately because of my concern that the categorical 
approach, along with its offspring, the modified categorical 
approach, is pushing us into a catechism of inquiry that 
renders these approaches ludicrous.  The categorical approach 
was developed to avoid the “practical difficulties and 
potential unfairness” inherent in “determining the precise 
facts underlying a defendant’s conviction when those facts 
are not plain from the elements of the offense itself.”1 
 
 Given the unique structure of RICO, we are able to 
determine easily what predicate offenses led to the RICO 
conviction.  There is no possibility of lack of precision.  
RICO’s cross-referential and multi-layered structure makes it 
unlike other criminal statutes.  Williams pleaded guilty to a 
RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  Section 1962(c) 
proscribes participating in the conduct of an interstate 
enterprise’s affairs through a “pattern of racketeering 
activity,” which RICO defines as “at least two acts of 
racketeering activity.”2  Thus, as we recently recognized, in 
order to a make out a § 1962(c) RICO violation, the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant himself engaged in at least two predicate acts of 
racketeering.3  Because a guilty plea requires a defendant to 
                                                          
1 United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142-43 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 
3 United States v. Ferriero, 2017 WL 3319283, at *6 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 4, 2017) 
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admit to every element of the offense, a defendant pleading to 
a RICO violation must therefore admit to at least two 
predicate acts.  The mere showing of any two predicate acts 
of racketeering alone, however, is not enough to sustain a 
1962(c) RICO conviction.  The law requires a jury to 
unanimously agree on the specific racketeering acts 
committed by the defendant and to find all the elements of 
those predicate acts. 4  By the terms of the statute, the two 
predicate racketeering acts are inextricably linked to the 
substantive § 1962(c) violation, and a RICO conviction 
cannot stand without them.   
 
 In this situation, I see no need to determine whether § 
1962(c) is a divisible statute; I see no need to discuss the 
alternative forms of conduct covered by it; I see no need to 
decode the offense of conviction or to ask whether it sweeps 
more broadly than the relevant generic offense.   
 
 Instead, I should be able to look at the RICO 
conviction and the integrated predicate acts.  The predicate 
acts here are drug offenses, violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and 846, both controlled substance offenses.  Voila, 
we can ascertain the precise facts underlying the defendant’s 
conviction.  The contortions of the modified categorical 
approach are needless.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
(citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 371 
(3d Cir. 2010)).  
4 United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978); see 
also Mod. Crim. Jury Instr. 3rd Cir. 6.18.1962C-8 (instructing 
that a jury must unanimously agree on the specific 
racketeering acts committed by the defendant).  
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 I write separately to explain this approach with the 
hope a future panel may see that there is no need, in the case 
of a RICO conviction, to engage in the catechism of the 
modified categorical approach.   
1 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the majority opinion except for Part II.A. There, 
the majority rules that consent to a search may be revoked, but 
that Carlton Williams did not do so. I would hold that he did. I 
am concerned that the majority’s ruling erects obstacles that 
will make it difficult, in the future, for individuals to withdraw 
consent to police searches. I nevertheless concur in the result 
because—taking consent out of the equation—there was 
probable cause to search Williams’s car. 
I.  
I agree with the majority’s ruling, joining other Circuits, 
that consent to search may be revoked. A person may “delimit 
as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents,” 
and the scope of the consent is measured by asking, “[W]hat 
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 
exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991).  
I also agree with the majority’s recounting of the facts, 
which is largely as follows. Trooper Michael Volk pulled 
Williams over on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, gave him a 
warning, told him he was free to go, and then asked if he would 
consent to a search of his car. Williams signed the proffered 
consent form. Then, for an hour and ten minutes on a dark 
winter night, he stood on the side of the highway with a second 
state trooper, Trooper Vresh, while Trooper Volk searched his 
car. A third trooper, Trooper Brautigam, also arrived shortly 
after the stop began. 
Williams testified at the suppression hearing that he 
eventually said, “[Y]ou searched my car three times, now you 
hold me up and I have to go.” United States v. Williams, No. 
2:14–cr–30, 2015 WL 5602617, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 2015). The 
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District Court found this testimony “only credible to a degree” 
because it was not audible on the video from the dashboard-
mounted camera in Trooper Volk’s cruiser.1 Id. The District 
Court does not explain the impact of its assessment that 
Williams’s credibility on this point was less than total. Instead, 
the opinion simply goes on to note that “there is no evidence 
that Trooper Volk heard Williams’ alleged comments, 
assuming such were made.” Id. 
Later in the search, Williams asked for his cell phones, 
which were in his car. Trooper Brautigam got them and began 
to read messages on one of the phones. Williams said that the 
officers could not search his phone without a warrant. When 
the troopers began to disassemble the stereo speakers in his 
trunk, Williams protested, “[Y]ou need a warrant to go through 
my speakers.” Id. In the ensuing exchange, Williams said, 
“I’ve been out here half an hour, man” (this was an 
understatement; it had been more than fifty minutes). Id. 
Finally, Trooper Volk discovered heroin hidden in the parking 
brake assembly. Id. 
I agree with the majority that when Williams said he had 
been “out [there] half an hour,” he could have been expressing 
impatience rather than withdrawing consent. But I view 
differently his earlier statement: “[Y]ou searched my car three 
times [and] y’all got me on the side of this road in the middle 
                                              
1 A review of the video makes clear that the 
microphone was on Trooper Volk’s person. It clearly picked 
up everything Trooper Volk said, and less clearly picked up 
others’ speech when they were speaking with him. It faintly 
and sporadically picked up other sounds, including comments 
by Williams and the trooper or troopers standing near him. 
When Trooper Volk got into his cruiser and closed the door, 
the road noise and all other sounds died away. 
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of the winter holding me up and I got to go.” Maj. Op. II.A. 
(emphasis added). I believe that a typical reasonable person 
would interpret this statement as withdrawing consent to any 
further search. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (asking what 
“the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the 
exchange between the officer and the suspect”). Indeed, it 
would be difficult to withdraw consent much more clearly, 
aside from saying, “Stop,” or “I no longer consent.” As the 
majority rightly notes, no one should have to say “a special set 
of words to withdraw consent.” Maj. Op. II.A. The majority’s 
holding, though, may render anything short of a “special set of 
words” insufficient.  
My position arguably conflicts with the Eighth Circuit, 
which ruled that a defendant’s “indicat[ion] that he needed to 
be on his way” did not withdrawal consent to a search. United 
States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001). Regardless 
of any conflict, however, I believe that the majority disregards 
the “reasonableness” that is the “touchstone” of the Fourth 
Amendment, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) 
(citations omitted), when it requires something more than 
Williams’s simple, direct statement that he needed to go. 
The majority supports its holding by saying that 
Williams knew how to withdraw consent because he “told the 
troopers that they did not have consent to search his speakers 
or his cellular phones.” Maj. Op. II.A. But Williams did not 
say that, and the inaccuracy of the majority’s paraphrase is 
consequential. Williams actually said that the troopers needed 
a warrant to search his speakers and cell phone. He was wrong, 
so his statements show only that he misunderstood Fourth 
Amendment law. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 
(1991) (generally, search of speakers would be permissible 
because warrantless search of an automobile encompasses “the 
containers within it”); Williams, 2015 WL 5602617, at *10 
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(“Under existing law at the time, Trooper Brautigam was 
authorized to examine Williams’ cell phones.”). As a logical 
matter, Williams’s attempt to assert garbled Fourth 
Amendment “rights” does not bear on whether he knew how to 
withdraw consent to a search. If anything, his comments show 
that he lacked an understanding of his rights that would have 
permitted him to speak with the level of clarity the majority 
seems to want. 
The majority further supports its conclusion by noting 
that there was no evidence—aside from Williams’s own 
testimony—that Trooper Volk heard his comment, “[Y]ou 
searched my car three times, now you hold me up and I have 
to go.” I do not believe that Trooper Volk’s ability to hear this 
comment is relevant. As the majority notes, he was assisted by 
two other troopers. The District Court found, more specifically, 
that Troopers Vresh and Brautigam arrived partway into the 
traffic stop, and that “Trooper Volk . . . directed [Williams] to 
wait with Trooper Vresh while Volk searched the vehicle.” Id. 
at *5. The record fully supports this finding, to which I defer. 
The dash camera video shows Williams walking off camera 
with Vresh to wait as directed, and then shows Brautigam 
walking on and off camera, clearly going back and forth 
between Williams’s car and where Williams was standing with 
Vresh. Because the troopers were working as a team, Williams 
should have been able to withdraw consent by speaking to any 
of them. The District Court made no findings with regard to 
whether Troopers Vresh or Brautigam could hear Williams’s 
comment, but the record shows that they, not Trooper Volk, 
were the ones in a position to hear Williams. 
II.  
Despite the fact that I believe Williams withdrew his 
consent to the search, I would affirm the District Court’s denial 
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of the suppression motion because there was probable cause to 
search Williams’s car. 
The facts leading up to the Turnpike stop were these. A 
confidential informant conducted two controlled buys of 
heroin from Williams in November and December 2012. Based 
on the way the drug was packaged, Pittsburgh Police task force 
Detective Eric Harpster believed the heroin was from Detroit. 
The detective obtained a warrant to install a tracking device on 
Williams’s car. On the day of the fateful traffic stop in January 
2013, Detective Harpster tracked the car as it drove from 
Pittsburgh to Detroit, made a very quick turnaround, and drove 
back toward Pennsylvania. Detective Harpster contacted 
Trooper Volk. He asked Trooper Volk to conduct a traffic stop 
and try to find any heroin that might be in Williams’s car.  
“The automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
permits law enforcement to seize and search an automobile 
without a warrant if ‘probable cause exists to believe it contains 
contraband.’” United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 
(1996)). In Burton, a confidential informant attempting to 
make a controlled buy of a small amount of cocaine 
unwittingly interrupted what appeared to be a large drug 
transaction taking place in a particular house. Id. at 94-95. A 
police drug task force, alerted to the large transaction, saw the 
defendant leave the house in question. Id. at 95. He put a plastic 
bag in the trunk of a car, made a telephone call, and drove 
away. Id. We ruled that the police had probable cause to search 
the car at that point “[b]ecause [they] observed Burton leave 
what they thought to be a drug deal and place the results of that 
transaction inside his trunk.” Id. at 100. 
“The probable cause inquiry is ‘commonsense,’ 
‘practical,’ and ‘nontechnical;’ it is based on the totality of the 
circumstances and is judged by the standard of ‘reasonable and 
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prudent men.’” United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 301 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 
(1983)). “At bottom,” the probable cause analysis “deal[s] with 
probabilities.” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). Here, the 
probable cause determination is similar to Burton. Williams 
had previously sold heroin that appeared to be from Detroit to 
a confidential informant. Williams’s car traveled to Detroit on 
the day in question, turned around quickly, and started 
traveling back. Looking at these facts in a practical and 
nontechnical fashion, the probability was that Williams had 
picked up drugs in Detroit and was bringing them back to 
Pittsburgh. Therefore, the police had probable cause to search 
the car regardless of whether Williams consented. 
Contrary to Williams’s argument, Detective Harpster 
was not required to recount the full probable cause analysis to 
Trooper Volk. “[T]he arresting officer need not possess an 
encyclopedic knowledge of the facts supporting probable 
cause, but can instead rely on an instruction to arrest delivered 
by other officers possessing probable cause.” Burton, 288 F.3d 
at 99. Nor is Williams persuasive when he implies that 
Detective Harpster needed to impart a certain quantum of 
information to Trooper Volk; we have held that “[a]n officer 
can lawfully act solely on the basis of statements issued by 
fellow officers . . . .” Id. at 99 (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 
F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 1997)). Finally, the situation did not 
need to be “dynamic” or “fast-paced” in order to justify 
Trooper Volk’s reliance. The situation in Burton was not 
particularly dynamic or fast-paced, but even so, we concluded 
that the arresting officer could rely on the task force officer’s 
instruction. See id. at 94-96. 
III.  
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment affirming 
the denial of the suppression motion. However, I would not 
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reach that result on the basis that Williams consented to the 
search (and failed to effectively withdraw his consent). Instead, 
I would hold that although he withdrew consent, there was 
probable cause to search his car. This analysis is more faithful 
to our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular, the 
reasonableness that is its touchstone. 
